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Fair Notice About Fair Notice
The rule of lenity requires the courts to construe ambiguous criminal
statutes in favor of the defendant.' The rule is intended, among other things, to
guarantee that no criminal defendant will be caught off guard by a broader
reading of a statute than he anticipated; it reflects our collective "instinctive
distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said
they should."' At the same time, the lenity canon serves to ensure that a statute
will not be interpreted more broadly than the legislature intended.3 But what
would happen if a legislature passed a statute telling courts that they could not
rely on the rule of lenity any longer, thereby limiting the courts' ability to
preserve the fair-notice values that underpin the canon?
As it turns out, most state legislatures appear to have done just that.4
Eleven have explicitly barred the courts from using the rule of lenity, enacting
laws requiring, for example, that the courts construe a criminal statute
"according to the fair meaning of [its] terms" or "to promote justice and effect
1. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-6o (1987) ("The Court has often stated that
when there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we
are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language.").
2. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, reprinted in HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 196,
209 (1967)); see also McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (noting that the rule of
lenity ensures that "a fair warning ... [is] given to the world in language that the common
world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed"); Nicholas
Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARv. L. REV. 2085, 2094
(2002) ("The rule of lenity ensures that criminal statutes are sufficiently clear to satisfy
due-process notice.").
3. See Zachary Price, The Rule of Leniry as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 885, 887
(2004).
4. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2203
(2002).
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the objects of the law" rather than reading the statute in favor of the
defendant.' Others have been more circumspect, directing the courts to
construe criminal statutes "liberally"6 or to "depart[] from literal construction"
when doing so would better promote the intent of the legislature.' Still others
have enacted general rules of interpretation that could be read to bar the use of
the lenity canon.8
Nonetheless, state courts have not always followed these lenity-displacing
statutes. Rather, most state supreme courts seem to be invoking lenity when it
suits their fancy.' In doing so, though, they have not been clear about why they
should be allowed to reject the legislature's will, why they are choosing to
invoke lenity, or even whether they are relying on the lenity canon at all.
To be sure, the state courts' reluctance to follow these legislated rules is
understandable. One might think that individuals have a right to know what
conduct is and is not criminal -a right that the legislature cannot take away. It
is also understandable that state judges might be reluctant to say outright that
they will disregard the legislature's will; for one thing, judges who directly
challenge the political branches and whose decisions can be construed as
"pro-criminal" are vulnerable to bacldash.o But as this Comment shows, state
5. See Price, supra note 3, at 902-03 & n.111. For examples of state laws using variants of the
"promote justice" formulation, see ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 13-104 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 203 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS 5 750.2 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. 5 45-1-102(2)
(2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 625:3 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. 5 161.025(2) (2011);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 5 22-1-1 (20o6); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 5 1.o5(a) (West 2011); and
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-1o6 (LexisNexis 2003). 1 am indebted to Price, supra note 3, which
drew my attention to many of the examples cited in this Comment.
6. Price, supra note 3, at 903. Statutes requiring liberal construction include IDAHO CODE
5 73-102(1) (2011); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 500.030 (LexisNexis 2008); and N.D. CENT.
CODE § 1-02-01 (2008).
7. N.Y. STAT. LAw § ill (McKinney 2011).
8. See, e.g., AIA. CODE 5 13A-1-6 (2011). Price notes that the commentary to the Alabama
statute supports the notion that the provision is intended to abrogate the lenity canon. Price,
supra note 3, at 903 & n.i16; see also ALA. CODE § 13A-1-6 cmt. (noting that "[t]he original
draft expressly abolished the common law rule that penal laws are to be strictly construed,"
but that "the old rule of strict construction is practically meaningless as it is seldom cited [by
Alabama courts] and then only to support a conclusion already reached by reference to the
fair meaning of the words and phrases used in the statute and a consideration of the
legislature's intent").
9. See infra Part II.
10. The decision of California voters to remove state supreme court Chief Justice Rose Bird, at
least in part because of her opposition to the death penalty, provides perhaps the best
example of this phenomenon. See Robert Lindsey, Deukmejian and Cranston Win as 3 Judges
Are Ousted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1986, http://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/o6/us/elections
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judges cannot have it both ways. If judges try to construe laws to be consistent
with the lenity canon's notice-giving values while avoiding an outright clash
with the state legislature, they undermine the very same values that they seek
to preserve."
I. STATE COURT PRACTICE
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has cited the rule of lenity relatively
infrequently of late," the question of legislative override of lenity is a live one in
the states. In fact, several state displacement statutes have been cited-not
always approvingly-more than ten times per year over the past two decades."
Indeed, while some state supreme courts have chosen to follow their
legislatures' interpretive rules, most have instead limited the force of those
requirements." Some courts have explicitly employed the rule of lenity despite
clear legislation barring such a move," but others have come down somewhere
in between-neither disclaiming the rule of lenity entirely nor employing it
-story-some-key-states-deulmejian-cranston-win-3-judges-are-ousted.html (describing a
high-profile campaign to oust Bird that focused on her opposition to the death penalty).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See Price, supra note 3, at 885-86. The rule has also fallen out of favor among academics. See,
e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction ofPenal Statutes, 71 VA.
L. REV. 189, 189 (1985) ("I believe that the rule of strict construction -at least as it is
conventionally understood -is, and probably should be, defunct."); Dan M. Kahan, Leniry
and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 348 ("The time has come . . .
formally to dispatch the [rule of lenity] .... .").
13. For example, a search of the "Citing References" tab on the Westlaw Next page for
California's liberal construction statute, CAL. PENAL CODE 5 4 (West 2012), returned 213
citations in federal and state opinions between January 1, 1992 and January 1, 2012.
14. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1919-20 (2011) (citing Hayes v. Cont'1 Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 668,
676-78 (Ariz. 1994); Brodie v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 156 P.3 d 1100, 1107 (Cal.
2007); Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 5o P-3d 488, 493 (Idaho 2002); State v. Dullard,
668 N.W.2d 585, 595 (Iowa 2003); Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165 P.3 d 1079,
1o91 (Mont. 2007); Burke v. Webb Boats, Inc., 37 P.3 d 811, 814 (Okla. 2001); Everhart v.
PMA Ins. Grp., 938 A.2d 301, 307 (Pa. 2007)).
is. See, e.g., State v. Pena, 683 P.2d 744, 748-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) ("A.R.S. 5 13-104
abolishes the general rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed; nevertheless, where
the statute itself is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant."), affd, 683 P.2d 743 (Ariz. 1984);
see also Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Barnes,
859 P.2d 1387, 1388 (Idaho 1993); State v. Richard, 786 A.2d 876, 879 (N.H. 2001); State v.
Laib, 644 N.W.2d 878, 882-83 (N.D. 2002).
2397
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
explicitly.16 Often, though, the courts have been either vague or contradictory
in their reasoning. 7 As a result, the case law provides neither a clear rationale
for following or dismissing a legislated rule, nor even any guidance about
whether the courts are following or dismissing the rule in the first place.
Consider the experience of California. The state's code includes a provision
barring use of the lenity canon: "The rule of the common law, that penal
statutes are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. All its
provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with
a view to effect its objects and to promote justice."" The case of Keeler v. Superior
Court 9 forced the state supreme court to confront the legislature's anti-lenity
mandate, although the high court did its best to dodge the question. In Keeler,
the court had to decide whether the state's murder statute, which prohibited
the "killing of a human being," covered the intentional killing of a viable fetus
that the mother wished to carry to term.2 o The defendant, a divorc6 who
learned that his ex-wife was pregnant by another man, responded to the news
by attacking her violently. In particular, he said he would "stomp [the fetus]
out" of her and then kneed her in the stomach, ultimately fracturing the fetus's
skull.2" The statutory text did not resolve the case: no court had interpreted the
term "human being" either to include or to exclude a viable fetus that the
mother wished to carry to term, and the common law was of no help.
Moreover, while the salience of the abortion issue made it unclear what the
legislature would have done if faced with precisely this question, it seems
unlikely-given the horrific nature of the crime-that it would have intended
to create a law that would let the defendant off on the lesser charge of assault."
And yet, ultimately, the Keeler court interpreted the ambiguous murder
statute to exclude the defendant's actions. In doing so, the court seemed to rely
i6. For example, in State v. Legg, 9 S.W. 3 d 111, 116 (Tenn. 1999), the Tennessee Supreme Court
cites the state law requiring interpretation "according to the fair import of [the substantive
criminal statute's] terms," TENN. CODE ANN. 5 39-11-104 (1997), but holds open the
possibility of strict construction in certain (poorly articulated) circumstances.
17. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
18. CAL. PENAL CODE 5 4 (West 2012).
19. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). While California's large population makes it an important case
study for any discussion of lenity, other state courts have issued similar decisions. See, e.g.,
State v. Alford, 970 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tenn. 1998) (applying "the rule of statutory
construction which requires that criminal statutes be strictly construed in favor of the
defendant," despite the fact that Tennessee has passed a lenity-displacing statute).
2o. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 618-19; see also Elhauge, supra note 4, at 2195.
21. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 618.
22. See Elhauge, supra note 4, at 2195.
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on the California anti-lenity statute while simultaneously invoking lenity-like
concerns to acquit the defendant of murder. First, the majority took notice of
the anti-lenity statute, observing that "the Penal Code commands us to
construe its provisions 'according to the fair import of their terms, with a view
to effect its objects and to promote justice."'. Next, the majority swore
allegiance to the plain meaning rule, promising to follow all of the typical
textualist methods of statutory interpretation. The court nevertheless
concluded by invoking concerns of notice and due process, declining to apply
the murder statute to the defendant. After all, the court noted, "[t]he first
essential of due process is fair warning of the act which is made punishable as a
crime.""s In fact, just one page after admitting that the legislature had
prohibited it from applying the lenity canon to criminal cases, the court found
that " [t]he terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties."" This formulation echoes decisions
explicitly invoking the rule of lenity in dozens of jurisdictions around the
country. 7
II. THE COSTS OF INDECISION
Keeler is just one of many cases in which state courts dealing with anti-
lenity statutes have vacillated between adhering to the legislature's will and
23. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 625 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 2012)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 626.
26. Id. at 626 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
27. Though the California Supreme Court attempted to explain away Keeler's apparent
inconsistencies some thirty years later in People v. Avery, 38 P-3d i (Cal. 2002), the
rationalization seems to me unavailing. In Avery, the court suggested that its lenity
jurisprudence is "fully consistent with section 4." Id. at 6. After all, the court noted,
"although true ambiguities are resolved in a defendant's favor, an appellate court should not
strain to interpret a penal statute in defendant's favor if it can fairly discern a contrary
legislative intent." Id. However, Avery fails to fully reconcile these two lines of authority.
California courts have invoked the lenity-like principle of Avery even before concluding that
they could "do no more than guess" at a statute's meaning. See id. There is a vast gap
between construing a criminal statute strictly and construing it according to the fair import
of its terms but then siding with the defendant when all else fails. By suggesting that the
"susceptible of two reasonable interpretations" standard is consistent with the anti-lenity
statute, see id. at 5, Avery failed to resolve the critical question of whether the courts should
put a thumb on the scale anytime a statute is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations or
only when they can do no more than guess as to the statute's meaning. Thus, Keeler's lack of
clarity persists.
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following the common law rule of lenity. My purpose here is to show that there
are costs to such indecision, and to propose what I call a "second-order clear
statement rule" -a clear statement rule for judges interpreting a legislature's
first-order pronouncements. The courts' refusal (or inability) to be clear about
their own views on the anti-lenity statutes -and to justify whatever decisions
they make - undermines the goals that lenity is meant to serve in the first place.
After all, if the rule of lenity is meant (at least in part) to ensure that potential
criminal defendants are put on notice about the illegality of their actions, then
if the courts are not clear about the interpretive method they are using,
criminal defendants risk being left in the dark not only about the meaning of a
state's substantive laws, but also about how the courts will decide how to decide
what the law means. Arguably, a person who does not know how his state's
courts will construe a criminal statute is even more in the dark than a person
who does know that his state's courts will construe the criminal statute broadly
without reference to the rule of lenity. A rule of lenity whose application is
uncertain may be just as problematic from a fair-notice perspective as having
no rule of lenity at all."
Moreover, because these objectives are enshrined in the Fourteenth
Amendment"o as well as in every state constitution,3 1 the displacement statutes
must be interpreted clearly, with an eye toward providing adequate notice to
potential defendants not about what the substantive law means, but about how
the courts will interpret that substantive law. This is true no matter what one
believes about the substantive advisability of narrow judicial construction.
Indeed, where a legislature has passed a lenity-displacing statute, judges must
clearly apply (or reject) the statute so as to achieve the fundamental goals that
28. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 12, at 345 ("Narrow construction of criminal statutes, it is
proclaimed, assures citizens fair notice of what the law proscribes . . . ."). But cf id. at 364
(stating that in the author's opinion, the fair-notice justification for lenity based on rule-of-law
values is a "rank fiction"). One might also characterize the notice concern as one of
Fourteenth Amendment due process. Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 2094 ("The rule of lenity
ensures that criminal statutes are sufficiently clear to satisfy [5th and 14 th Amendment]
due-process notice.").
29. This argument will certainly have particular force in situations in which the crime alleged
was of a regulatory nature-malum prohibitum, rather than malum in se. Thus, while
Keeler's treatment of California's section 4 provides a particularly stark example of a court
whose approach to lenity was inscrutable, there are no doubt other examples that may be
more appropriate substantively. See infifa note 40 and accompanying text.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i ("No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.").
31. For a representative example of a state constitutional due process provision, see CAL. CONST.
art. 1, § 7, which provides that "[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."
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lenity is intended to serve in the first place: fair notice and due process for the
defendant."
Admittedly, due process and fair notice are not the only reasons to invoke
the rule of lenity. Scholars and jurists have also argued that the rule serves
(1) to ensure that the legislative will is vindicated;" (2) to channel criminal
lawmaking into the political process ;14 (3) to protect against overcriminalization;
(4) to impel Congress to draft clearer statutes ;,6 and (5) to ensure that the
politically powerless are given a fair shake." However, as long as one believes
that the rule of lenity is motivated at least in part by constitutional concerns of
fair notice and due process, the availability of other arguments to support the
use of lenity does not undermine the fundamental point that a lack of second-
order clarity is a serious problem for the courts and potential criminal defendants.
Moreover, the dilemma remains whether or not one believes courts should
be able to ignore the legislature's desire to displace the lenity canon. 3 Indeed,
for those who think that constitutional concerns counsel against allowing
legislative rejection of the lenity canon, the result is obvious: the same concerns
that animate courts' decisions to embrace lenity in the face of legislative
32. One might argue that the "promote justice" formulation of statutes like California's allows
courts enough leeway to read statutes as they like without actually invoking the rule of
lenity. But this argument confuses first-order clarity with the second-order concerns I have
identified here. For while a statute requiring the courts to interpret statutes to promote
justice might be clear on its face, muddled judicial opinions addressing the statute could still
cause confusion among potential criminal defendants.
33. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
34. See Price, supra note 3, at 887.
35. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REv. 879, 939 (2005).
36. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules
as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 6oo (1992).
37. see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 357 (2d ed. 20o6) (suggesting that the rule of lenity "might
reflect a commonsense notion that potential criminal defendants are virtually impossible to
organize" against an adverse legal decision, whereas "prosecutors are easily organized to
propose such an amendment and have great legitimacy in making such a case to a
legislature").
38. For a range of views on that question, see Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 2094-98, which
discusses whether lenity is a 'starting-point rule' that may be altered by the legislature or
whether it is a 'constitutional' rule that cannot be overridden; Elhauge, supra note 4, at 2203,
which observes that, as a first principle, "the rule of lenity is merely a default rule, and like
all default rules this one should operate only if the relevant actor does not opt out of it"; and
Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEo. L.J. 341, 344
(2010), which argues that "[b]ecause the canons are nothing more than common law,
legislative enactments that repudiate or ratify canons should not only be included in any
conversation about the canons, but should be considered important and controlling."
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disapproval require that courts be clear about how they are using lenity and
interpreting the relevant interpretive statutes. And for those who believe that a
legislature should have the power to abrogate the rule of lenity, judicial opacity
and indecision are suboptimal. Even if one were to concede that a legislature
could abrogate the lenity canon itself, a mere statute could not override the
separate, constitutional due process right that is lost when potential criminal
defendants are left to guess how the law will be applied: the right to a process of
adjudication that provides adequate notice. The constitutional concerns would
remain, and the courts would still have to be clear about the bases for their
decisions in order to provide the required notice.
Several counterarguments are apparent. First, one might respond that
individuals are unlikely to be familiar with or to understand the criminal law at
all, let alone the substantive canons of interpretation. While nonlawyers are
unlikely to read criminal statutes that establish primary offenses, 9 they are
even less likely to read the rules of statutory interpretation that legislatures
promulgate or the judicial decisions construing those statutes. Thus, it is
implausible that anyone (except perhaps a lawyer or law student) is burdened
in any meaningful way by the uncertainty that exists in states whose highest
courts have issued ambivalent rulings with respect to displacement statutes.
Second, and similarly, the argument in favor of lenity would seem to be weaker
when the crime in question is committed in the heat of passion; in that case,
we usually assume that the offender could not help but commit the crime, and
so no amount of statutory clarity could have helped. Third, insofar as
individuals do read statutes like California's lenity-displacing law, then
displacement does not necessarily violate notice and due process: individuals
are on notice that courts might construe criminal statutes broadly.
However, none of these points is fatal to my argument. If the first
counterargument holds true-that is, if substantive canons are too complex,
and displacement statutes too obscure, to expect nonlawyers to be aware of
their existence or to be able to understand their reach-then the third
counterargument crumbles, and codified anti-lenity becomes a fair notice/due
process violation. Moreover, while we might not expect the typical offender to
be attuned to the minutiae of the criminal code-either because he is
39. See, e.g., Price, supra note 3, at 886 ("The [notice] theory is flawed because criminals do not
read statutes . . . ."); cf Jeffries, supra note 12, at 220 ("[A] court should avoid
interpretations that threaten unfair surprise. This concern should not be measured by the
hypothetical construct of'lawyer's notice,' which applies, albeit artificially, to a vast range of
cases, but by the narrower and more focused inquiry ... : Would an ordinarily law-abiding
person in the actor's situation have had reason to behave differently? In the unusual case
where that question would be answered 'no,' imposition of penal sanctions threatens
genuine unfairness and must be avoided.").
2402
FAIR NOTICE ABOUT FAIR NOTICE
unsophisticated or because he acted in the heat of passion -there is no doubt
that at least some sophisticated actors are aware of such details, most notably
those who face high legal stakes and who can afford the best lawyers.4o
On the other hand, if the third counterargument is accurate-that is, if
nonlawyers really are aware of the existence of and well versed in the scope of
lenity-displacing statutes, and if they modulate their behavior accordingly-
then my concern about the clarity of judicial decisions applying those statutes
is even more salient. After all, knowing about such a statute would be entirely
unhelpful if judges do not apply it consistently. In states whose high courts
speak to the question obliquely, uncertainty as to the (non)application of the
rule of lenity is problematic. And while it is possible that such inconsistency
would favor defendants on average-judges would presumably only depart
from an anti-lenity statute to treat defendants more leniently than the statute
suggests they would-that does not change the fact that defendants will not
know how they will be treated in a particular case. Due process is not
concerned with average results, but with fairness in each individual case.4"
CONCLUSION
These observations make it clear that the state courts must rethink their
approach to lenity and legislated interpretive rules. Indeed, so long as one
accepts that individuals should be able to discern what conduct is criminal and
what conduct is not, it follows that the courts ought to be clear about whether
they will apply state statutes displacing the rule of lenity. If, on the other hand,
courts choose to disregard these statutes, they should make their reasons known.
JEFFREY A. LOVE
4o. The force of this argument suggests that the case for lenity, and thus the argument for
second-order clarity, is strongest for criminal statutes that create offenses that are malum
prohibitum, rather than malum in se. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRIcKEY &
ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY 886 (4 th ed. 2007). In this sense, my argument mirrors the case for the
similar void-for-vagueness doctrine. See generally Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926). But cf [Anthony G. Amsterdam], Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 73-74 (1960) (arguing that the void-for-vagueness
doctrine is applied "inconsistently with the 'warning' rationale," and that the doctrine "has
been used by the Supreme Court almost invariably for the creation of an insulating buffer
zone of protection at the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms").
41. Cf Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241-43 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (concluding
that the death penalty had been imposed arbitrarily, even where the baseline was death and
certain defendants were given more lenient sentences).
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